[Publication] Housing speculation in the EU: Corporate landlords, real estate trusts, abusive speculative behaviour and impacts on prices and transactions

The EU is facing a housing affordability crisis. Across Member States (MSs) of the European Union (EU), house prices and rents have risen faster than incomes, access to homeownership is increasingly difficult, and growing numbers of households face housing insecurity. In addressing solutions, a focus is often set on housing supply shortages, however the growing financialisation of housing – i.e. the process through which housing has increasingly come to function as a financial asset alongside its social function as a home – should equally be considered and tackled.

From debt-driven to wealth-driven housing dynamics

The study examines institutional investors and corporate landlords in EU rental markets. While their overall share remains limited, ownership has grown rapidly since the 2008 financial crisis and become concentrated in specific cities and market segments. Between 2004 and 2024, the tangible assets held by EU-27 listed residential real estate funds grew from EUR 4.8 billion to EUR 198.7 billion. Over the same period, the EU’s share of global listed residential real estate assets increased from 19.3% to 27.5%, making the EU an increasingly important centre for residential real estate investment.

Historically, mortgage lending was the dominant link between finance and housing. Since the 1980s, expanding mortgage credit and securitisation fuelled house-price growth across much of the EU. After the global financial crisis of 2008, a new phase emerged. House prices continued to rise even as household mortgage credit stagnated or declined. The average level of household credit in the EU fell by 18% between 2015 and 2024, while house prices rose by 61% in the same period. This marks a transition from debt-driven to wealth-driven housing financialisation, in which accumulated housing wealth, institutional capital and the search for yield increasingly drive housing markets.

Types of housing speculation

The study distinguishes between four types of housing speculation. Types 1 and 2 concern investment in existing housing stock and short-term strategies aimed at capital gains but are difficult to measure empirically. Therefore, the analysis focuses on Types 3 and 4, which capture related practices that can be assessed through available evidence.

Type 3 speculation refers to business models that rely primarily on valuation gains rather than rental income generated through the productive use of housing.  The evidence is striking: between 2004 and 2024, the tangible assets of EU-listed residential funds increased by a factor of 42, while rental income increased only by a factor of 19. The ratio of property assets to rental income more than doubled, reaching 11.1 in 2024. In other words, for every EUR of annual rental income, listed residential funds held more than EUR 11 in housing assets. Unlisted residential real estate funds displayed even higher ratios, reaching 17 in 2024. This suggests that a significant share of institutional investment in housing is driven by the expectation of capital appreciation rather than by housing provision itself.

Type 4 speculation concerns landlord practices that undermine tenants’ rights and housing security, including displacement, no-fault evictions, harassment, under-maintenance, and ‘renovictions’, where renovations are used to remove tenants and justify rent increases. Property management practices become speculative when their primary purpose is to generate higher returns through tenant replacement, rent escalation or asset revaluation. Evidence reviewed across several MSs shows that these practices contribute to affordability pressures, insecurity of tenure, displacement and growing socio-spatial inequality.

Importantly, the study demonstrates that the presence of institutional investors varies considerably across the EU. The key determinant is not the existence of specific financial instruments such as REIT legislation, but whether housing assets are spatially concentrated, can be purchased in bulk and sold as one portfolio. Institutional investors have entered housing markets through three principal pathways: (1) privatisation of public and non-profit housing portfolios; (2) acquisition of distressed assets following mortgage and banking crises; and (3) investment in specialised housing sectors such as student housing, care homes, co-living and tourism-related accommodation. These pathways explain why some housing systems have become major targets for institutional investment while others remain comparatively resistant.

EU policy response

The study evaluates current EU policy responses. While recognising the European Commission’s (EC) acknowledgement of financialisation and speculation in the European Affordable Housing Plan (EAHP), it concludes that the Plan does not sufficiently address their structural causes. Its focus on monitoring, transparency and mobilising investment overlooks that easier access to finance does not necessarily create affordable housing. Institutional investors mainly acquire existing housing, with returns often driven by rising asset values rather than increased supply. Where finance expands faster than housing supply, additional capital risks increasing prices rather than improving affordability.

Policy responses in many MSs remain limited. The case studies of Denmark, Berlin and Barcelona show that governments can curb speculative practices and influence investor behaviour but also highlight the limits of isolated national or local action. As housing investment operates within integrated EU and global financial markets, capital can shift across borders in response to regulatory differences. Addressing housing financialisation therefore requires stronger EU coordination alongside national and local measures. The study concludes that housing should be treated first and foremost as essential social and economic infrastructure that benefits the well-being of citizens rather than primarily as an investment asset, requiring both regulation of speculative practices and greater support for social, public, cooperative and other non-financialised housing models.

Recommendations

1. Distinguish between finance that helps people obtain a home to live in and finance that treats housing as an investment asset.
2. Apply this distinction consistently across the EU rather than leaving it to each MS.
3. Reintroduce credit guidance, meaning measures that steer bank lending towards affordable housing production.
4. Direct lending towards productive investment in line with the EU’s competitiveness agenda.
5. Make access to public support conditional on capital that is long-term and accepts non-speculative returns.
6. Assess housing finance carefully: support new affordable construction but avoid measures that raise existing house prices.
7. Strengthen transparency over who owns property, how it changes hands, and how rents and valuations are set.
8. Confront the tax-avoidance structures of cross-border landlords.
9. Strengthen rent regulation frameworks to limit excessive rent increases.
10. Prevent renovictions and restrict renovation-driven rent increases.
11. Improve security of tenure by strengthening tenant protections.
12. Expand and reinvest in social housing where strong social housing sectors already exist.
13. Develop non-profit and permanently affordable housing sectors where social housing is limited.
14. Use public land strategically, by using rights of first refusal and public acquisition powers to secure land and housing for social purposes.
15. Coordinate action at EU level to prevent regulatory arbitrage.